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Issues and Findings 
Discussed in this Brief: Research ex-
ploring police officers' understanding of 
agency rules concerning police miscon-
duct and the extent of their support for 
these rules. The survey also considered 
officers' opinions about appropriate 
punishment for misconduct, their famil-
iarity with the expected disciplinary 
threat, their perceptions of disciplinary 
fairness, and their willingness to report 
misconduct. The results of this survey 
have important implications for re-
searchers and policymakers, as well as 
for police practitioners. 
Key issues: Until recently, most stud-
ies of police corruption were based 
on a traditional administrative ap-
proach-one that views the problem 
of corruption primarily as a reflection 
of the moral defects of individual po-
lice officers. This research, however, is 
based on the organizational theory of 
police corruption, which emphasizes 
the importance of organizational and 
occupational culture. 
Researchers asked officers in 30 U.S. 
police agencies for their opinions about 
various hypothetical cases of police mis-
conduct, thereby avoiding the resis-
tance that direct inquiries about corrupt 
behavior would likely provoke. The sur-
vey measured how seriously officers re-
garded police corruption, how willing 
they were to report it, and how willing 
they were to support punishment. By 
analyzing officers' responses to the sur-
vey questions, researchers were able to 
oolice agencies according to 
ronments of integrity. Theca-
measure integrity in this way is 
significant for police adminis-
ho, this research suggests, 
)le to influence and cultivate 
continued ... 
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The Measurement of Police Integrity 
By Carl B. Klockars, Sanja Kutnjak /vkovich, William E. Harver, and Maria R. Haberfeld 
As the history of virtually every police 
agency attests, policing is an occupation 
that is rife with opportunities for miscon-
duct. Policing is a highly discretionary, 
coercive activity that routinely takes 
place in private settings, out of the sight 
of supervisors, and in the presence of wit· 
nesses who are often regarded as unreli-
able. Corruption-the abuse of police 
authority for gain-is one type of mis· 
conduct that has been particularly prob-
lematic. The difficulties of controlling 
corruption can be traced to several fac-
tors: the reluctance of police officers to 
report corrupt activities by their fellow 
officers (also known as "The Code," "The 
Code of Silence," or "The Blue Curtain"), 
the reluctance of police administrators to 
acknowledge the existence of corruption 
in their agencies, the benefits of the typi-
cal corrupt transaction to the parties in-
volved, and the lack of immediate victims 
willing to report corruption. 
Until recently, police administrators 
viewed corruption primarily as a reflec-
tion of the moral defects of individual 
police officers. They fought corruption 
by carefully screening applicants for po-
lice positions and aggressively pursuing 
morally defective officers in an attempt 
to remove them from their positions be-
fore their corrupt behavior had spread 
through the agency. This administrative/ 
individual approach, sometimes called 
the "bad apple" theory of police corrup-
tion, has been subject to severe criticism 
in recent years. 
This Research in Brief summarizes a 
study that measured police integrity in 30 
police agencies across the United States. 
The study was based on an organiza-
tional/occupational approach to police 
corruption. Researchers asked officers 
for their opinions about 11 hypothetical 
cases of police misconduct and measured 
how seriously officers regarded police 
corruption, how willing they were to sup-
port its punishment, and how willing they 
were to report it. The survey found sub-
stantial differences in the environments 
of integrity among the agencies studied. 
The more serious the officers considered 
a behavior to be, the more likely they 
were to believe that more severe disci-
pline was appropriate, and the more will-
ing they were to report a colleague for 
engaging in that behavior. 
Contemporary approaches 
to corruption 
Pioneered by Herman Goldstein, 1 con-
temporary theories of police corruption 
are based on four organizational and 
occupational dimensions. Each is 
described below. 
•• 
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environments of integrity within their 
agencies. 
Key findings: Based on officers' 
responses to questions relating to 11 
hypothetical case scenarios involving 
police officers engaged in a range of 
corrupt behavior, the following con-
clusions emerged: 
• In assessing the 11 cases of po-
lice misconduct, officers considered 
some types to be significantly less 
serious than others. 
• The more serious the officers 
perceived a behavior to be, the 
more likely they were to think that 
more severe discipline was appro-
priate, and the more willing they 
were to report a colleague who 
had engaged in such behavior. 
• Police officers' evaluations of the 
appr~riate and expected discipline 
for various types of misconduct were 
very similar; the majority of police 
officers regarded the expected disci-
pline as fair. 
• A majority of police officers said 
that they would not report a fellow 
officer who had engaged in what 
they regarded as less serious mis-
conduct (for example, operating an 
off-duty security business; accepting 
free gifts, meals, and discounts; or 
having a minor accident while driv-
ing under the influence of alcohol. 
• At the same time, most police 
officers indicated that they would 
report a colleague who stole from 
a found wallet or a burglary scene, 
accepted a bribe or kickback, or 
used excessive force on a car thief 
after a foot pursuit. 
• The survey found substantial differ-
ences in the environment of integrity 
among the 30 agencies in the sample. 
Target audience: Criminal justice 
researchers and policymakers, legis-
lators, police administrators, police 
officers, and educators. 
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sion concerns how the orgamzauonal 
rules that govern corruption are estab-
lished, communicated, and understood. In 
the United States, where police agencies 
are highly decentralized, police organiza-
tions differ markedly in the types of ac-
tivities they officially prohibit as corrupt 
behavior. This is particularly true of mar-
ginally corrupt or mala prohibita behav-
ior, such as off-duty employment and 
acceptance of favors, small gifts, free 
meals, and discounts. Further complicat-
ing the problem, the official policy of 
many agencies formally prohibits such 
activities while their unofficial policy, 
supported firmly but silently by supervi-
sors and administrators, is to permit and 
ignore such behavior so long as it is lim-
ited in scope and conducted discreetly. 
Prevention and control mechanisms. 
The second dimension of corruption em-
phasized in contemporary approaches is 
the wide range of mechanisms that police 
agencies employ to prevent and control 
corruption. Examples include education 
in ethics, proactive and reactive investi-
gation of corruption, integrity testing, and 
corruption deterrence through the disci-
pline of offenders. The extent to which 
agencies use such organizational anticor-
ruption techniques varies greatly. 
The Code. The third dimension of cor-
ruption, inherent in the occupational cul-
ture of policing, is The Code or The Blue 
Curtain that informally prohibits or dis-
courages police officers from reporting the 
misconduct of their colleagues. The pa-
rameters of The Code-precisely what be-
havior it covers and to whom its benefits 
are extended-vary among police agen-
cies. For example, The Code may apply to 
only low-level corruption in some agen-
cies and to the most serious corruption in 
others. Furthermore, whom and what The 
Code covers can vary substantially not 
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mly among police agencies but also 
within police agencies. Particularly in 
large police agencies, the occupational 
culture of integrity may differ substan-
tially among precincts, service areas, 
task forces, and work groups. 
Public expectations. The fourth dimen-
sion of police corruption that contemporary 
police theory emphasizes is the influence 
of the social, economic, and political envi-
ronments in which police institutions, sys-
tems, and agencies operate. For example, 
some jurisdictions in the United States 
have long, virtually uninterrupted tradi-
tions of police corruption. Other jurisdic-
tions have equally long traditions of 
minimal corruption, while still others have 
experienced repeated cycles of scandal 
and reform. Such histories indicate that 
public expectations about police integrity 
exert vastly different pressures on police 
agencies in different jurisdictions. These 
experiences also suggest that public pres-
sures to confront and combat corruption 
may be successfully resisted. 
Methodological challenges to 
the study of police corruption 
Although many theories can be applied to 
the study of police corruption, the contem-
porary organizational/occupational culture 
theory has an important advantage over the 
traditional administrative/individual bad-
apple theory: The organizational/occupa-
tional approach is much more amenable 
to systematic, quantitative research. 
Corruption is extremely difficult to study 
in a direct, quantitative, and empirical 
manner. Because most incidents of cor-
ruption are never reported or recorded, 
official data on corruption are best re-
garded as measures of a police agency's 
anticorruption activity, not the actual 
level of corruption. Even with assurances 
of confidentiality, police officers are un-
•• Research in Brief • I 
likely to be willing to report their own 
or another officer's corrupt activities. 
Unlike the administrative/individual 
approach, an organizational/occupa-
tional culture approach to the study of 
police integrity involves questions of 
fact and opinion that can be explored 
directly, without arousing the resis-
tance that direct inquiries about cor-
rupt behavior are likely to provoke. 
Using this approach, it is possible to 
ask nonthreatening questions about 
officers' knowledge of agency rules and 
their opinions about the seriousness of 
particular violations, the punishment 
that such violations would warrant or 
actually receive, and their estimates of 
how willing officers would be to report 
such misconduct. 
Moreover, sharply different goals and 
visions of police integrity characterize 
these two approaches to understanding 
corruption. The administrative/indi-
vidual theory of corruption envisions 
the police agency of integrity as one 
from which all morally defective indi-
vidual officers have been removed and 
in which vigilance is maintained to pre-
vent their entry or emergence. By con-
trast, the organizational/occupational 
culture theory envisions the police 
agency of integrity as one whose culture 
is highly intolerant of corruption. 
Methodologically, the consequences of 
these two visions are critical. For ex-
ample, although it may be possible to 
use an administrative/individual ap~ 
proach to measure the level of corrupt 
behavior, the number of morally defec-
tive police officers, and an agency's 
vigilance in discovering misconduct, 
the obstacles to doing so are enormous. 
Using an organizational/occupational 
culture approach, by contrast, modem 
social science can easily measure how 
seriously officers regard misconduct, 
how amenable they are to supporting 
punishment, and how willing they are 
to tolerate misconduct in silence. 
In an effort to measure the occupational 
culture of police integrity, a systematic, 
standardized, and quantitative survey 
questionnaire was designed and pre-
tested. The survey sought information 
in key areas that constitute the founda-
tion of an occupational/organizational 
culture theory of police integrity. At the 
same time, the survey responses could 
be used to satisfy certain basic informa-
tional needs of practical police admin-
istration. The survey attempted to 
answer the following questions: 
• Do officers in this agency know the 
rules governing police misconduct? 
• How strongly do they support those 
rules? 
• Do officers know what disciplinary 
threat they face if they violate those 
rules? 
• Do they think the discipline is fair? 
• How willing are they to report 
misconduct? 
For a more detailed description of the 
survey methodology and samples, see 
Survey Design and Methodology. The 
actions taken to enhance the legitimacy 
of the survey results are discussed in 
Validity of Survey Responses. 
Survey results 
responses to the survey questions 
suggests that all six integrity-related 
questions measured the same phe-
nomenon-the degree of police intol-
erance for corrupt behavior. 
Offense seriousness. The 11 case 
scenarios fall into 3 categories of per-
ceived seriousness. Four cases were 
not considered very serious by police 
respondents: Case 1, off-duty opera-
tion of a security system business; 
Case 2, receipt of free meals; Case 4, 
receipt of holiday gifts; and Case 8, 
coverup of a police accident that in-
volved driving under the influence of 
alcohol (DUI). The majority of police 
respondents, in fact, reported that the 
operation of an off-duty security sys-
tem business (Case 1) was not a viola-
tion of agency policy. Respondents 
considered four other cases of miscon-
duct to be at an intermediate level;of 
seriousness: Case 10, the use of exces-
sive force on a car thief following'a, 
foot pursuit; Cas~ 7, a supervisor who 
offers a subordinate. time off during 
holidays in exchange for tuning up his 
personal car; Case 9, acceptance of 
free drinks in exchange for ignoring 
a late bar closing; and Case 6, receip~ 
of a kickback. Respondents regarded 
the remaining three cases-those that 
involved stealing from a found wallet 
(Case 11), accepting a money bribe 
(Case 3), and stealing a watch at a 
crime scene (Case 5)-as very serious 
offenses. 
Discipline. In general, police officers 
The results of the survey, reported in thought that the four cases they re-
exhibit 1, show that the more serious garded as not very serious warranted 
a particular behavior was considered little or no discipline. Officers thought 
by police officers, the more severely that the four cases involving an inter-
they thought it should and would be mediate level of seriousness merited a 
punished, and the more willing they written reprimand or a period of sus-
were to report it. The extraordinarily pension, and that the three very seri-
high rank-order 009\Je,n~~~WJO~E FRoOMases merited dismissal. 
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Survey Design and Methodology 
ase scenarios. The survey ques-
tionnaire presented officers with 11 hy-
pothetical case scenarios. Displayed in 
exhibit A, the scenarios cover a range of 
activities, from those that merely give an 
appearance of conflict of interest (Case 1) 
to incidents of bribery (Case 3) and theft 
(Cases 5 and 11 ). One scenario (Case 1 O) 
described the use of excessive force on a 
car thief. 
Respondents were asked to evaluate each 
scenario by answering seven questions 
Exhibit A. Case scenarios 
(see exhibit B). Six of these questions were de-
signed to assess the normative inclination of 
police to resist temptations to abuse the 
rights and privileges of their occupation. To 
measure this dimension of police integrity, the 
six questions were paired as follows: 
• Two questions pertained to the serious-
ness of each case---Dne addressed the 
respondent's own view and the other 
concerned the respondent's perception 
of the views of other officers. 
Case 1. A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs security 
devices, such as alarms, special locks. etc He does this work during his off-duty hours. 
Case 2. A police officer routinely accepts free meals. cigarettes, and other items of small value 
from merchants on his beat He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse 
the generosity of those who give gifts to him . 
Case 3. A police officer stops a motorist for speeding . The officer agrees to accept a personal 
gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation. 
Case 4. A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays local merchants and 
restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts 
of food and liquor. 
Case 5. A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop The display cases are smashed, 
and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes 
a watch, worth about 2 days' pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had been 
stolen during the burglary. 
Case 6. A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer the 
owners of cars damaged in accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral, 
he receives payment of 5 percent of the repair bill from the shop owner. 
Case 7. A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work 
during coming holidays. A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to 
tune up his supervisor's personal car. Evaluate the supervisor's behavior. 
Case 8. At 2:00a.m., a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted 
road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He 
approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxi-
cated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident 
and offense, he transports the driver to his home 
Case 9. A police officer finds a bar on his beat that is still serving drinks a half-hour past its 
legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to 
accept a couple of free drinks from the owner. 
Case 10. Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an 
automobile. The man flees . They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending 
him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control, both 
officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and 
resisting. 
Case 11. A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot, It contains an amount of money 
equivalent to a full day's pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property 
but keeps the money for himself. 
••• 4 . . ~~ 
• Two related to severity of discipline-
one addressed the discipline the respon-
dent felt the behavior should receive 
and the other addressed the discipline 
the officer felt it would receive. 
• Two concerned willingness to report 
the misconduct-one addressed the 
respondent's own willingness to 
report it, and the other concerned 
the respondent's perception of other 
officers' willingness to report it. 
The remaining question asked respon-
dents whether the behavior described 
in the scenario was a violation of the 
agency's official policy. 
The incidents described in the scenarios 
were not only plausible and common 
forms of police misconduct, but ones that 
were uncomplicated by details that might 
introduce ambiguity into either the inter-
pretation of the behavior or the motive 
of the officer depicted in the scenario. 
Some scenarios were based on published 
studies that had employed a case scenario 
approach.• Others drew on the experience 
of the authors. Respondents were asked 
to assume that the officer depicted in each 
scenario had been a police officer for 5 
years and had a satisfactory work record 
with no history of disciplinary problems. 
Survey sample. The sample consisted of 
3,235 officers from 30 U.S. police agen-
cies. Although these agencies were drawn 
from across the Nation and the sample 
was quite large, it was nonetheless a con-
venience sample, not a representative 
sample. The characteristics of the officers 
in this sample are summarized in exhibit C. 
The majority of the police officers surveyed 
were employed in patrol or traffic units 
(63.1 percent). The overwhelming majority 
of respondents were line officers; only 
one of five police officers was a supervisor. 
The mean length of service for the entire 
sample was 10.3 years. 
•• • Research in Brief •• 
The sample has some biases, including 
overrepresentation of particular types of 
police agencies and particular regions of 
the country. Because it includes no State 
police agencies, only one sheriff's agency, 
and only one county police agency, the 
sample overrepresents municipal police 
agencies. The sample also overrepresents 
police agencies from the Northeast. Al-
though the sample does include agencies 
from the South, Southeast, and Southwest, 
it does not include agencies from the West, 
Northwest, or Midwest. 
The sample likely has another bias because 
not all agencies that were asked to partici-
pate in the study accepted the invitation. 
The reason for an agency's refusal to par-
ticipate could include a fear of revealing 
something untoward. Agencies declined 
to participate despite assurances that their 
participation in the suNey would be kept 
confidential; that all individual respondents 
would remain anonymous; and that re-
spondents would be asked about only 
their opinions, not any actual misconduct. 
Nevertheless, the sample includes some 
seriously troubled police agencies. Key 
contacts in a number of such agencies, 
including senior officers and high-ranking 
union officials, exercised sufficient influ-
ence to arrange the participation of these 
agencies in the suNey. 
a. A number of studies of police corruption 
have employed a research strategy that asked 
police officers to evaluate hypothetical corrup-
tion scenarios. These include Fishman, Janet 
E., Measuring Police Corruption, New York: 
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 1978; 
Martin, Christine, Illinois Municipal Officers' 
Perceptions of Police Ethics, Chicago: Illinois 
Criminal Justice Information Authority, 1994; 
Huon, Gail F., Beryl L. Hesketh, Mark G. Frank, 
Kevin M. McConkey, and G.M. McGrath, Per-
ceptions of Ethical Dilemmas, Payneham, Aus-
tralia: National Police Research Unit, 1995; 
and Miller, Larry S., and Michael C. Braswell, 
" Pol ice Perceptions of Ethical Decision-
Making: The Ideal vs. The Real, " American 
Journal of Police 27 (1992): 27-45. 
Exhibit B. Case scenario assessment options 
1. How serious do YOU cons ider this behavior to be? 
Not at all serious 
1 2 3 4 
Very serious 
5 
2. How serious do MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY consider this behavior to be? 
Not at all serious 
1 2 3 4 
Very serious 
5 
3. Would this behavior be regarded as a violation of official policy in your agency? 
Definitely not Definitely yes 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if 
any discipline do YOU think SHOULD follow? 
1. NONE 4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY 
2. VERBAL REPRIMAND 5. DEMOTION IN RANK 
3. WRITIEN REPRIMAND 6. DISMISSAL 
5. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if 
any discipline do YOU think WOULD follow? 
1. NONE 4. PERIOD OF SUSPENSION WITHOUT PAY 
2. VERBAL REPRIMAND 5. DEMOTION IN RANK 
3. WRITIEN REPRIMAND 6. DISMISSAL 
6. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior? 
Definitely not Definitely yes 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY would report a fellow 
pol ice officer who engaged in th is behavior? 
Definitely not 
1 2 3 4 
Definitely yes 
5 
Exhibit C. Characteristics of the police agency sample 
Agency Size Percentage Percentage 
(number of of National Sample Supervisory Patrol! 
sworn officers) Sample Size Percentage Traffic 
Very Large (500+) 59.9 1,937 14.8 64.2 
Large (201-500) 19.7 638 23.2 60.3 
Medium (76-200) 9.0 292 29 .9 59.0 
Small (25-75) 8.5 275 30.8 66.1 
Very Small (<25) 2.9 93 35 .9 64.8 
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Validity of Survey Responses 
he validity of the survey's results 
hinges on the honesty of police officers 
when responding to the survey questions. 
Several steps were taken to enhance the 
legitimacy of the survey results. First, offic-
ers were asked only about their attitudes, 
not about their actual behavior or the ac-
tual behavior of other police officers. They 
also were assured that their responses 
would remain confidential, although po-
lice respondents are naturally suspicious of 
such promises. 
To further allay officers' fears that their 
identities might be discovered, they were 
asked only minimal background questions: 
their rank, length of service, and assign-
ment and whether they held a supervisory 
position. They were not asked standard 
questions about age, race, gender, or 
ethnicity in an effort to assuage fears that 
disclosing such information, in combination 
with their rank, assignment, and length of 
To measure how officers perceived 
the fairness of discipline, the scores 
on the "discipline would receive" 
scale were subtracted from the scores 
on the "discipline should receive" 
scale. A difference of zero was inter-
preted to mean that the respondent 
thought the discipline was fair. If the 
difference was greater than zero 
(positive), the respondent thought that 
the discipline was too lenient. Con-
versely, if the difference was less 
than zero (negative), the respondent 
thought that the discipline was too 
harsh. 2 In 7 of the ll cases, the over-
whelming majority of police officers 
in the sample thought that the disci-
pline that would be imposed was in 
the "fair" range. But in the remaining 
service, would make it possible to identify 
them. 
In addition, at the end of the survey, 
each police respondent was asked two 
questions about the validity of the re-
sponses. The first was "Do you think 
most police officers would give their 
honest opinion in filling out this ques-
tionnaire?" The second was "Did you?" 
In answer to the first question, 84.4 per-
cent of police respondents reported that 
they thought most officers would an-
swer the questions honestly, and 97.8 
percent reported that they themselves 
had done so. The responses of the 2.2 
percent of police officers who reported 
that they had not answered the ques-
tions honestly were discarded when the 
survey results were analyzed. 
The survey questions also were designed 
to minimize any temptation for officers to 
manipulate responses to create a favor-
able impression on the public or on their 
four cases, including three that offic-
ers considered not serious-Case 2 
(accepting free meals and discounts 
on the beat), Case 4 (accepting holi-
day gifts), Case 8 (coverup of police 
DUI), and Case 10 (excessive force on 
car thief)-more than 20 percent of 
police officers believed that the disci-
pline administered by their agencies 
would be too harsh. 
Parameters of The Code. An exami-
nation of the parameters of The Code of 
Silence, as revealed in the responses of 
police officers in the sample, indicated 
that the majority would not report a po-
lice colleague who had engaged in be-
havior described in the four scenarios 
considered the least serious. At the 
same time, a majority indicated that 
~ .. 6 .. ~ 
supervisors. Some officers, for example, 
might have been inclined to report that 
certain types of misconduct were more 
serious than they actually thought them 
to be. At the same time, however, these 
officers would be unlikely to report that 
misconduct should be punished more 
severely than they thought appropriate 
because of the possibility that they might 
one day be subject to such discipline, if 
administrators believed that they were 
recommending it. 
Furthermore, if any substantial manipula-
tion of answers had occurred, it would 
have been evident in differences in corre-
lation coefficients among the questions 
about seriousness, discipline, and willing-
ness to report. In fact, the rank order 
correlation between all six questions is 
extraordinarily high. Indeed, one could 
predict with great accuracy the ranking of 
a scenario on any one of the six questions 
by knowing the ranking for any other. 
they would report3 a fellow police of-
ficer who had engaged in behavior they 
deemed to be at an intermediate or high 
level of seriousness. 
Agency contrasts in the 
culture of integrity 
Measurements of the inclination of U.S. 
police to resist temptations to abuse the 
rights and privileges of their occupation 
are likely to prove useful for academic, 
historical, and cross-cultural studies of 
police.4 For police administrators, how-
ever, measurements of the culture of in-
tegrity of individual police agencies are 
more relevant than national averages, 
which often mask significant differ-
ences among agenc1es. 
••• Research in Brie f 
Exhibit 1. Police officers' perceptions of offense seriousness, appropriate and expected discipline, and willingness to 
report, ranked by officers' perceptions of case seriousness* 
Seriousness Discipline Willingness to Report 
Own View Other Officers Should Receive Would Receive Own View Other Officers 
Case Scenario Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Mode Score Rank 
Case 1. Off-Duty 
Security System 
Business 1.46 1 1.48 1 1.34 1 None 1.51 1 
Case 2. Free Meals, Verbal 
Discounts on Beat 2.60 2 2.31 2 2.13 2 reprimand 2.37 2 
Case 4. Holiday Gifts Verbal 
From Merchants 2.84 3 2.64 3 2.53 3 reprimand 2.82 3 
Case 8. Coverup of Suspend 
Police DUI Accident 3.03 4 2.86 4 2.81 4 without pay 3.21 4 
Case 10. Excessive Suspend 
Force on Car Thief 4.05 5 3.70 5 3.76 6 without pay 4.00 6 
Case 7. Supervisor: Written 
Holiday for Tuneup 4.18 6 3.96 6 3.59 5 reprimand 3.43 5 
Case 6. Auto Repair Suspend 
Shop 5% Kickback 4.50 7 4.26 7 4.40 8 without pay 4.46 8 
Case 9. Drinks to Suspend 
Ignore Late Bar Closing 4.54 8 4.28 8 4.02 7 without pay 4.08 7 
Case 11. Theft From 
Found Wallet 4.85 9 4.69 9 5.09 10 Dismissal 5.03 10 
Case 3. Bribe From 
Speeding Motorist 4.92 10 4.81 10 4.92 9 Dismissal 4.86 9 
Case 5. Crime Scene 
Theft of Watch 4.95 11 4.88 11 5.66 11 Dismissal 5.57 11 
* Scores are based on officers' responses to the integrity-related survey questions. 
To uncover these differences and allow 
comparisons to be made, a system was 
devised for ranking the responses of 
officers in each agency. To determine 
an agency's overall ranking on how its 
officers perceived the seriousness of a 
particular offense, the mean score of all 
responses by officers in that agency to 
each of the 11 case scenarios was com-
pared to the mean scores of the remain-
ing 29 agencies. The agency was then 
awarded 3 points if its mean score 
placed it among the top lO agencies on 
any question, 2 points if it scored in 
the middle 10, and 1 point if it scored 
among the lowest 10. These scores were 
then totaled for all 11 case scenarios. 
Using this scaling system, an agency's 
score on its officers' perceptions of the 
seriousness of the offenses could range 
from 11 (if it ranked in the lowest third 
of agencies on all11 cases) to 33 (if it 
ranked among the highest third of agen-
cies on all11 cases).5 
These summary scores formed the ba-
sis for placing agencies in rank order 
from 1 to 30 (with 1 being the highest 
integrity rating), making it possible to 
say that an agency ranked "n out of 
30" in its officers' perceptions of of-
fense seriousness. This procedure was 
used to calculate a summary score and 
an integrity ranking for each agency's 
responses to each of the six questions 
about offense seriousness, discipline 
that should and would be received, 
and willingness to report the offense. 
Exhibit 2 summarizes those rankings. 
The enviromnent of integrity in 
two agencies. To illustrate how envi-
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Mode Score Rank Score Rank 
None 1.37 1 1.46 1 
Verbal 
reprimand 1.94 2 1.82 2 
Written 
reprimand 2.36 4 2.28 3.5 
Suspend 
without pay 2.34 3 2.28 3.5 
Suspend 
without pay 3.39 5 3.07 5 
Written 
reprimand 3.45 6 3.29 6 
Suspend 
without pay 3.95 8 3.71 8 
Suspend 
without pay 3.73 7 3.47 7 
Dismissal 4.23 10 3.96 10 
Dismissal 4.19 9 3.92 9 
Dismissal 4.54 11 4.34 11 
ronments of integrity differ across U.S. 
police agencies, it is useful to contrast 
the responses of officers from two of 
the agencies in the sample. Agency 2, 
which ranked 8th in integrity of the 
30 agencies surveyed, and Agency 23, 
which ranked in a 5-way tie for 24th 
place, are both large municipal police 
agencies. Agency 2 has a national repu-
tation for integrity, is extremely recep-
tive to research, and is often promoted 
as a model of innovation. Agency 23 
has a long history of scandal, and its 
reputation as an agency with corruption 
problems persists despite numerous re-
form efforts. Although a local newspa-
per once dubbed Agency 23 "the most 
corrupt police department in the coun-
try," six other agencies in the sample 
appear to have integrity environments 
that are as poor or worse. 
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In both agencies, the correlation of the 
scores' rank ordering among the catego-
ries was very high, as it was for all 30 
agencies surveyed. For every agency, 
the mean rank order of officers' re-
sponses to the six integrity-related 
questions was nearly identical. Further-
more, the rank ordering of the scenarios 
differed little among the agencies. 
Although differences in the rank or-
dering of the scenarios were minimal, 
both within and between the two agen-
cies, discrepancies in the agencies' 
absolute scores reflected significant 
differences (see exhibits 3 and 4). 
Estimates of offense seriousness were 
consistently higher for Agency 2 than 
for Agency 23. The differences were 
especially large (between 0.5 and 1.0 
on a 5-point scale) for three scenarios: 
Case 6 (auto repair shop kickback), 
Case 9 (drinks to ignore late bar clos-
ing), and Case 10 (excessive force on 
car thief). Police officers from Agency 
2 evaluated each of these cases as 
substantially more serious than did 
officers from Agency 23. 
The mean scores for discipline indicate 
that, in almost every case, police offic-
ers in Agency 2 not only expected 
more severe discipline than did officers 
in Agency 23, but they also thought 
that more severe discipline was appro-
priate. The differences in perceptions 
of discipline were especially great for 
the most serious types of corruption, 
such as the scenarios described in 
Case 3 (bribe from speeding motorist), 
Case 5 (crime scene theft of watch), 
and Case 11 (theft from found wallet), 
as well as for Case 10 (use of excessive 
force). While officers in Agency 2 
thought that dismissal would result 
from the four most serious cases, offic-
ers in Agency 23 expected that dis-
missal would follow only one scenario, 
Case 5 (theft from a crime scene). 
Exhibit 2. Composite scores on seriousness of offense, discipline, and 
willingness to report, rank-ordered by agency 
Other 
Own Officers' Discipline 
Agency Opinion of Opinions of Should 
Number Seriousness Seriousness Receive 
1 3 3 3 
3 3 3 3 
4 3 3 3 
6 3 3 3 
10 3 3 3 
17 3 3 3 
30 3 3 3 
2 3 2 3 
18 2 2 3 
7 3 2 2 
11 3 3 2 
12 3 3 3 
5 2 2 2 
19 3 2 2 
20 3 2 2 
29 2 3 2 
26 3 2 2 
27 2 2 2 
24 2 2 1 
21 1 1 2 
22 1 1 2 
9 2 1 2 
16 1 1 1 
13 1 2 1 
14 1 1 1 
15 1 1 1 
23 1 1 1 
25 1 1 1 
8 1 1 1 
28 1 1 1 
The most systematic and dramatic dif-
ference between Agencies 2 and 23, 
however, is evident in their attitudes 
toward The Code of Silence. In both 
agencies, few officers said that they or 
their police colleagues would report 
any of the least serious types of cor-
rupt behavior (Cases 1, 2, 4, and 8). 
Officers from Agency 2 reported that 
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Other Summary 
Discipline Own Officers' Score/ 
Would Willingness Willingness Integrity 
Receive to Report to Report Ranking 
3 3 3 18/1 
3 3 3 18/1 
3 3 3 18/1 
3 3 3 18/1 
3 3 3 18/1 
3 3 3 18/1 
3 3 3 18/1 
3 3 3 17/8 
3 3 3 16/9 
2 3 3 15/10 
2 2 2 14/11 
1 2 2 14/11 
3 2 2 13/13 
2 2 2 13113 
2 2 2 13/13 
1 2 2 12/16 
2 1 1 11/17 
1 2 2 11/17 
1 2 2 10/19 
3 1 1 9/20 
2 1 2 9/20 
1 1 1 8/22 
1 2 2 8/22 
1 1 1 7/24 
2 1 1 7/24 
1 2 1 7/24 
2 1 1 7/24 
2 1 1 7/24 
1 1 1 6/29 
1 1 1 6/29 
they and their colleagues would report 
the behavior described in the seven 
other cases. In Agency 23, however, 
there was no case that the majority of 
officers indicated they would report. In 
sum, while The Code is under control 
in Agency 2, it remains a powerful in-
fluence in Agency 23, providing an 
environment in which corrupt behavior 
can flourish. 
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Exhibit 3. Agency 2 vs. Agency 23: Officers' own perceptions of seriousness of misconduct, discipline warranted, and 
willingness to report offense 
Agency 2 (A2) vs. Agency 2 (A2) vs. Agency 2 (A2) vs. 
Agency 23 (A23) Agency 23 (A23) Agency 23 (A23) 
Perception of Seriousness Discipline Should Receive Will ingness To Report 
Case Scenario A2 A23 
Case 1. Off-Duty Security 
System Business 1.57 1.36 
Case 2. Free Meals, 
Discounts on Beat 3.04 2.85 
Case 3. Bribe From 
Speeding Motorist 4.94 4.78 
Case 4. Holiday Gifts 
From Merchants 3.07 2.79 
Case 5. Crime Scene 
Theft of Watch 4.97 4.79 
Case 6. Auto Repair 
Shop 5% Kickback 4.58 4.02 
Case 7. Supervisor: 
Holiday for Tune up 4.16 4.05 
Case 8. Coverup of 
Police DUI Accident 3.16 2.68 
Case 9. Drinks to Ignore 
Late Bar Closing 4.68 3.77 
Case 10. Excessive 
Force on Car Thief 4.45 3.49 
Case 11. Theft From 
Found Wallet 4.94 4.55 
* Not significant. 
Conclusions and implications 
Redefining the problem of police cor-
ruption (i.e., the abuse of police author-
ity for gain) as a problem of police 
integrity-the normative inclination 
among police to resist temptations to 
abuse their authority-enables the di-
rect measurement of the major proposi-
tions of an organizational/occupational 
theory of police integrity. The research 
reported in this Research in Brief dem-
onstrates that police attitudes toward 
the seriousness of misconduct, the dis-
cipline that should and would result, 
and the willingness of officers to toler-
ate misconduct in silence can be mea-
sured. Moreover, the measurements 
reported in this national sample are 
relatively easy to collect. At the same 
time, they demonstrate substantial 
Difference ttest A2 A23 Difference 
-2.82 
0.21 p<.05 1.47 1.24 0.23 
-1.80 
0.19 p<.01 2.50 2.31 0.19 
-3 .72 
0.16 p<.001 5.02 4.44 0.58 
-2.47 
0.28 p<.01 2.73 2.59 0.14 
-4.21 
0.18 p<.001 5.85 4.90 0.95 
-6 .74 
0.56 p<.001 4.41 3.74 0.67 
-1.24 
0.11 NS* 3.58 3.51 0.07 
-4.32 
0.48 p<.001 2.85 2.57 0.28 
-9.96 
0.91 p<.001 4.10 3.17 0.93 
-10.12 
0.96 p<.001 3.97 3.15 0.82 
-6.85 
0.39 p<.001 5.42 4.13 1.29 
differences in the environments of 
integrity in U.S. police agencies. 
The ability to measure environments of 
integrity in police agencies holds great 
potential for academic studies of po-
lice and for practical police adminis-
tration. For researchers, quantitative 
cross-cultural, historical, and national 
comparisons that were previously un-
thinkable have now become feasible. 
Equally important, such measurements 
have direct implications for practical 
police administration because each of 
the propositions of an organizational/ 
occupational theory of integrity im-
plies a specific administrative re-
sponse. If officers do not know whether 
certain conduct violates agency policy 
or what disciplinary threats the agency 
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ttest A2 A23 Difference t test 
-3.60 -4.78 
p<.001 1.57 1.22 0.35 p<.001 
-2.48 -6.67 
p<.01 2.42 1.75 0.67 p<.001 
-6.28 -16.09 
p<.001 4.67 3.02 1.65 p<.001 
-1.35 -6.24 
NS* 2.74 2.05 0.69 p<.001 
-12.64 -15.97 
p<.001 4.92 3.36 1.56 p<.001 
-6.47 -15.63 
p<.001 4.38 2.71 1.67 p<.001 
-0.72 -8.68 
NS* 3.68 2.66 1.02 p<.001 
-2.69 -5.66 
p<.05 2.67 2.03 0.64 p<.001 
-10.45 -16.02 
p<.001 4.21 2.48 1.73 p<.001 
-8.30 -13.42 
p<.001 4.02 2.53 1.49 p<.001 
-14.17 -17.41 
p<.001 4.74 2.95 1.79 p<.001 
makes, administrators have a clear 
responsibility to communicate this 
information to officers. If officers do 
not regard certain misconduct as suffi-
ciently serious, if they regard discipline 
as too severe or too lenient, or if they 
are willing to tolerate the misconduct 
of their police peers in silence, admin-
istrators have an obvious obligation to 
find out why. A police administrator 
can take specific actions to deal with 
each of these problems. 
The survey instrument used in this 
study was designed to assess only one 
aspect of police integrity. In all case 
scenarios but one-the use of exces-
sive force-the misconduct described 
was motivated by personal gain. In 
discussing environments of integrity, 
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Exhibit 4. Agency 2 vs. Agency 23: Officers' perceptions of how most police would assess offense seriousness, discipline 
that offense would receive, and whether most police would be willing to report offense 
Agency 2 (A2) vs. Agency 2 (A2) vs. 
Agency 23 (A23) Agency 2 (A2) vs. Agency 23 (A23) 
How Most Police Agency 23 (A23) Whether Most Police 
Regard Seriousness Discipline Would Receive Would Be Willing To Report 
Case Scenario A2 A23 
Case 1. Off-Duty Security 
System Business 1.52 1.31 
Case 2. Free Meals, 
Discounts on Beat 2.53 2.57 
Case 3. Bribe From 
Speeding Motorist 4.82 4.60 
Case 4. Holiday Gifts 
From Merchants 2.73 2.61 
Case 5. Crime Scene 
Theft of Watch 4.93 4.62 
Case 6. Auto Repair 
Shop 5% Kickback 4.31 3.75 
Case 7. Supervisor: 
Holiday for Tuneup 3.85 3.85 
Case 8. Coverup of 
Police DUI Accident 2.80 2.54 
Case 9. Drinks to Ignore 
Late Bar Closing 4.32 3.44 
Case 10. Excessive Force 
on Car Thief 4.01 3.22 
Case 11. Theft From 
Found Wallet 4.83 4.24 
* Not significant. 
therefore, this survey makes no obser-
vation about abuses of discretion in ar-
rests, order maintenance, discourtesy 
to citizens, or other police misconduct 
not usually motivated by temptations 
of gain. A second generation of this 
survey will explore those problems.6 
A final note 
This survey does not measure the ex-
tent of corruption in any police agency 
or institution. Rather, it measures the 
culture of police integrity-the norma-
tive inclination of police officers to re-
sist the temptations to abuse the rights 
and privileges of their office. The sur-
vey does not identify either corrupt or 
honest police officers; nor does it pro-
Difference ttest A2 A23 Difference 
-1.61 
0.21 NS* 1.70 1.33 0.37 
0.41 
-0.04 NS* 2.77 2.51 0.26 
-4.25 
0.22 p<.001 4.90 4.45 0.45 
-1.10 
0.12 NS* 3.07 2.88 0.19 
-6.16 
0.31 p<.001 5.73 4.93 0.80 
-6.28 
0.56 p<.001 4.45 3.91 0.54 
0.04 
0 NS* 3.24 3.52 -0.28 
-2.61 
0.26 p<.05 3.33 2.83 0.50 
-9.13 
0.88 p<.001 4.11 3.29 0.82 
-8.00 
0.79 p<.001 4.11 3.46 0.65 
-8.53 
0.59 p<.001 5.24 4.25 0.99 
vide any evidence of abusive or dishon-
est practices-past, present, or future. 
The survey findings do describe, in a 
fairly precise way, the characteristics of 
a police agency's culture that encour-
age its employees to resist or tolerate 
certain types of misconduct. 
Notes 
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spective on Its Nature and Control, Washington, 
DC: Police Foundation, 1975; and Goldstein, 
H., Policing a Free Society, Cambridge, MA: 
Ballinger, 1977. See also Sherman, Lawrence 
W., Scandal and Reform, Berkeley: University 
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by Carl Klockars and Stephen Mastrofski, 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993: 398-412. 
2. Note that the notions of "greater than zero 
(positive)" and "less than zero (negative)" are 
merely shorthand for discipline perceived as 
too lenient and too harsh, respectively. In other 
words, because the data are ordinal, positive or 
negative differences will not be used in any al-
gebraic context. Rather, these differences will 
be used solely as indicators to classify respon-
dents into three groups-those who perceive 
discipline to be fair, too lenient, or too harsh. 
3. The frequency distribution of responses to 
the question about officers' own willingness to 
report a particular offense was analyzed. The 
five-point scale of offered answers ranged from 
!="definitely not" to 5="definitely yes." A cu-
mulative frequency above 50 percent for l and 
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2 was interpreted to indicate that police offic-
ers would not report the offense. A cumulative 
frequency above 50 percent for 4 and 5, on the 
other hand, was interpreted to indicate that the 
police officers would report the offense. 
4. See, for example, Haberfeld, Maria, Carl 
Klockars, Sanja Kutnjak lvkovich, and Milan 
Pagon, "Disciplinary Consequences of Police 
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